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of an Appropriate Standard
I. Introduction
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,' the United States Supreme Court grap-
pled for the first time with the issue of student searches under the
fourth amendment. 2 The Court took a needed step forward in ac-
knowledging the privacy rights of students3 and in articulating a
standard that can provide adequate protection for those rights.
4
However, it misapplied this standard to the facts of the case. This
error need not undermine the opinion's mandate to educators: they
must respect students' right to privacy. In order to understand and
fulfill this obligation, educators must have a clear and complete un-
1. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is "to safeguard
the privacy and security of the individual against arbitrary invasions by government offi-
cials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1978). There have been a
number of state and lower federal court decisions on the subject of public school
searches. See infra notes 15-16. For a general discussion see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 10.11 (1978 & Supp. 1985); W.
RINGEL, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, § 17.2 (1984); W. LAFAVE
ANDJ. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.9(k) (1985).
3. Several lower courts have held that the fourth amendment right to privacy does
not apply to students. See, e.g., In re G., 1 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Cal. D.
Ct. App. 1970) (upholding search of student who was reportedly intoxicated); Doe v.
Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (upholding general search of students by
drug detection dogs); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (upholding search of student's locker); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt,
227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (upholding search of student
who was allegedly selling drugs). For an explanation of the justifications used to deny
students fourth amendment protections, see infra notes 15-16. See also Cotton and
Haage, Students and the Fourth Amendment: The Torturable Class, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 709
(1983); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L.
REV. 739 (1974).
4. The Supreme Court adopted a "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test
and set forth a two-step analysis to control its application. See infra text accompanying
notes 36-40. A number of lower courts have employed a "reasonable suspicion" or
"reasonable grounds" standard in assessing the validity of student searches. See, e.g.,
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Horton v. Gosse Creek Independent
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Scott D., 34
N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d
75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
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derstanding of the T.L.O. decision. This Comment will illuminate
and address the opinion's inconsistencies. It will decipher the
meaning of the Supreme Court's ruling for educators and students
and explain the impact that it should have on our schools.
II. Facts and Holding
A teacher reported to the assistant principal of the Piscataway
High School that T.L.O. 5 and another student had been smoking in
the bathroom. Smoking was permitted in designated areas of the
school, but was prohibited in the bathroom. When the assistant
principal questioned T.L.O., she denied that she had been smoking
in the bathroom and claimed that she did not smoke at all. The
assistant principal then asked for her purse. Upon opening it, he
saw a package of cigarettes. He reached for the cigarettes, held
them before T.L.O. and said, "You lied to me." 6 When he removed
the cigarettes, the assistant principal noticed rolling papers in the
purse. Because he associated rolling papers with marijuana use, he
proceeded to search the entire contents of the purse. This search
uncovered a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, several empty
plastic bags, approximately forty dollars in small bills and change,
an index card listing the names of students who owed T.L.O.
money, and two letters implicating T.L.O. in drug dealing.
7
The assistant principal turned the evidence of drug dealing over
to the police and suspended T.L.O. from school for ten days.
T.L.O. was then taken to police headquarters, where she admitted
to selling marijuana to other students. The state brought delin-
quency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Rela-
tions Court.
8
The trial court denied T.L.O.'s motion to suppress the evidence
found in her purse.9 An appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the evidence had not been obtained in violation of the
5. None of the judicial opinions reveal the student's name. Her initials are used to
preserve anonymity because of her juvenile status. Some articles have disclosed T.L.O.'s
name. In order to respect the student's privacy, this Comment will not do so.
6. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 336-37, 463 A.2d 934, 936 (1983).
7. Id.
8. T.L.O. was adjudicated a delinquent and sentenced to probation for one year with
special conditions regarding curfew, school attendance and completion of a therapy pro-
gram. Hogan & Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools, 7 WHrrrTER L. REV.
527, 532 (1985)
9. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct.
1980). Counsel for T.L.O. argued that the search of her client was illegal and therefore
that the evidence obtained should be withheld from admission in accordance with the
exclusionary rule. See infra note 12.
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fourth amendment.' 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. It
found that the search in question was unreasonable and ordered
suppression of the evidence found in the purse."
The United States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to
decide whether evidence unlawfully seized by a school official
should be excluded from admission in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding.' 2 However, the Court decided that it would not address
this issue "in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if
any, the fourth amendment places on the activities of school author-
ities." 13 Consequently the Court ordered oral argument on the le-
gality of the search of T.L.O.'s purse.
14
All members of the Court agreed that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to
searches of students conducted by public school officials. The
10. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1982).
11. State ex rel. T.L.O, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983). In so holding, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey employed a reasonableness standard that does not differ
significantly from that used by the United States Supreme Court. See infra note 37 and
text accompanying notes 36-40. Yet the two courts reached opposite conclusions: the
New Jersey court invalidated the search while the Supreme Court upheld it. The
Supreme Court attributed this discrepancy to "a somewhat crabbed notion of reasona-
bleness" on the part of the state court. 105 S. Ct. at 745. This Comment argues, how-
ever, that the contradictory results can be attributed to the Supreme Court's
misapplication of the reasonableness standard. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
12. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the exclusionary rule was
adopted by the federal courts to safeguard the guarantees of the fourth amendment.
Pursuant to this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is in-
admissable in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 398. In 1961, the rule was held applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The state's petition for certiorari in T.L.O. was granted in October of 1983. On March
28, 1984, the Court heard argument on the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for student searches conducted in violation of the fourth amendment. 105 S. Ct.
at 733. Counsel for T.L.O. maintained that the exclusionary rule mandated suppression
of the evidence illegally taken from her client's purse. The State's Attorney insisted that
the rule was not applicable to this search because excluding evidence from court would
not tend to deter school officials from engaging in illegal searches. 52 U.S.L.W. 3731
(U.S. April 10, 1984). For support of the position taken by defense counsel, see
Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY'S L.
J. 933, 943-45 (1985).
13. 105 S. Ct. at 738.
14. 53 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Sept 18, 1984). Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan and
Blackmun would have applied the exclusionary rule to school searches, and therefore
dissented from the decision to order reargument. 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984). Chastising
the majority,Justice Stevens wrote: "Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite
for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least when it comes to
restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen." Id. at 3584. Professor Yale Kamisar
has asserted that the reargument was ordered because a majority could not be obtained
in favor of abolishing the exclusionary rule for searches conducted by school officials.
See Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J. 54 (1985).
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Court rejected the state's argument that school officials could claim
immunity from the fourth amendment under the doctrine of in loco
parentis,15 and found that school officials are exercising public rather
than private authority when conducting searches of students.' 6 In
addition, the Court asserted that students have legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy while on school grounds, and that these privacy
rights must be respected in accordance with the dictates of the
fourth amendment.'
7
In order to establish the standard of reasonableness governing
15. William Blackstone described the doctrine of in loco parentis as it applies to the
relationship between school officials and students:
[the parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correc-
tion as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453. A number of courts have held that school offi-
cials act in an in loco parentis capacity in conducting searches of students. Having deter-
mined that school personnel exercise authority derived from parents, these courts have
found that student searches were either not subject to the constraints of the fourth
amendment or were governed by a lesser standard. See, e.g., D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d
252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 30 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); R.M.C. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); In re Donald B., 61 A.D.
204, 401 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
The doctrine of in loco parentis has come under increasing attack in recent years. See
Dutton,Justifying School Searches: the Problems with the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, 8 J. Juv. L.
140 (1984). Parents can choose to withhold evidence which would incriminate their
child from the police without incurring criminal liability. Few parents would entrust this
choice to school authorities. Also, unlike parents, teachers may not be primarily con-
cerned with the interests of the child being disciplined, but rather may act to protect the
student body at large. Id. Still, prior to T.L.O., the doctrine had not been completely
abandoned by courts considering school searches. See, e.g., R.M.C., 660 S.W.2d at 554
(court acknowledged waning use of the doctrine of in loco parentis but found itself bound
by prior law to apply it). One commentator has noted: "The phrase in loco parentis has
become a substitute for analysis, and consequently is deserving of the description which
the Supreme Court once gave to the similar term parens patriae: a 'Latin phrase [which
has] proved to be a great assistance to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of
juveniles from the constitutional scheme.'" W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 456 (quoting In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
16. The fourth amendment does not protect the individual against searches con-
ducted by private citizens not acting on behalf of the government. Burdeau v. McDow-
ell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). On the basis of this exception, a number of courts had taken
the view that school personnel who conducted searches on their own initiative acted as
private citizens rather than governmental agents and were thus not subject to fourth
amendment limitations. See, e.g., In re J.A., 85 II1. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc.2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256-57 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1970); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145, 147 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1974); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). How-
ever, if characterized as a "disciplinary officer" or "security officer," the school official
was considered a public authority subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 697, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Term 1971),
aftd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972); People v. Bowers, 77
Misc.2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Term 1974).
17. 105 S. Ct. at 742.
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school searches, the Court attempted to balance the privacy rights it
had acknowledged against the need to maintain discipline in
schools. It found that in order for school officials to protect the
safety of students adequately, the constitutional protections sur-
rounding privacy rights must be modified. Consequently, the Court
eliminated the requirement that a warrant be obtained before a
search is conducted' 8 and modified the constitutional probable
cause standard as a prerequisite for a full-scale search.' 9 It adopted
a "reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard. Applying
this standard to the facts of the case, the Court found that T.L.O.'s
privacy rights had not been violated.
The decision rendered by the Court has three distinct substantive
parts: first, the determination that the fourth amendment applies to
student searches; second, the articulation of the standard governing
such searches; and third, the application of the standard to the facts
of the case. 20 A careful review of the opinion reveals that apparent
conflicts between parts one and two can be reconciled, but that part
three sharply contradicts the two preceding sections. In order to
18. The warrant requirement interposes a neutral magistrate between an officer "en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" and the objects of the
officer's search. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). This requirement is
meant to ensure an objective and disinterested determination that prior to the search
the officer has information which establishes probable cause. See infra note 19. In ac-
cordance with the language of the fourth amendment, a warrant must describe the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. Thus the scope of the search is
limited by the factual basis of the probable cause showing. There are clearly delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement, all of which stem from exigency concerns, i.e.
the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or infeasible. See infra
note 40. The dissenting Justices agreed that teachers would be unable to carry out es-
sential teaching functions and to protect students' safety if they were required to obtain
warrants before conducting searches. For an argument against abandoning the warrant
requirement in schools, see Buss, supra note 3, at 748-53.
19. Probable cause is a term of art that summons up a highly developed legal doc-
trine. The seminal statement on the nature of the probable cause requirement is found
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925): Probable cause exists where "the
facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they had reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reason-
able caution in the belief" that a criminal offense has been committed and that evidence
will be found in the place searched. The history of the probable cause standard is dis-
cussed in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959).
20. It is important to note that the opinion is limited to these three areas of inquiry.
The Court made clear in extensive footnotes just how narrow a decision this was. It did
not address: (1) the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of unlawful
searches conducted by school officials, 105 S. Ct. at 739 n.3; (2) whether students have
legitimate privacy interests in lockers and desks, and the standard that should govern
searches of these areas, id. at 741 n.5; (3) the appropriate standard for assessing the
legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with the police, id. at
744 n.7; and (4) whether student searches can be conducted in the absence of individu-
alized suspicion, id. at 744 n.8.
145
Yale Law & Policy Review
abide by the opinion, educators must acknowledge and attempt to
resolve this contradiction.
III. Students' Privacy Rights and the Fourth Amendment
In the first part of the TL. 0. opinion, the Court reviewed its prior
efforts to apply constitutional analysis to the classroom 2' and reaf-
firmed the position that constitutional safeguards must remain oper-
ative in schools. First, the Court rejected the contention that school
officials act in a private, rather than in a governmental or law en-
forcement, capacity when conducting searches of students, and are
therefore not bound by the fourth amendment.2 2 The Court explic-
itly recognized that teachers are state officials and that students are
citizens. Because the Constitution places limits on state action
which prohibit the exploitation of governmental power, teachers
must respect students' rights when exercising their authority.
Second, the Court dismissed the argument that an in loco parentis
relationship justifies a denial of fourth amendment protection. 23
"Such reasoning," said the Court, "is in tension with contemporary
reality and with the teachings of this court." It observed: "In carry-
ing out searches and other disciplinary functions . . .school offi-
cials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates of
the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment."
24
The Court acknowledged that the teacher-student relationship
does not mirror the parent-child relationship. It is assumed that
parents act with benevolent intent to protect their children; there-
fore, within this relationship, children arguably do not need fourth
amendment safeguards. Parents are expected to exercise sound dis-
cretion and act in their children's best interest. Teachers, however,
21. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School District, 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (under the first amendment right to free speech, students cannot be pre-
vented from wearing armbands as a war protest: "students [do not] shed their constitu-
tional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(fourteenth amendment due process clause applies to school suspension hearing; funda-
mentally fair procedures consist at a minimum of notice to the student of the charges
against him and the opportunity to be heard); West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requirement that students recite pledge of allegiance
while saluting flag struck down as violative of students' first and fourteenth amendment
rights); Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (first amendment imposes re-
strictions on a school board's exercise of its discretion to remove books from high
school and junior high school libraries).
22. See supra note 16.
23. See supra note 15.
24. 105 S. Ct. at 741.
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do not have the same kind of inherently intimate connection with
their students. Within schools, the fourth amendment must prevent
arbitrary and unnecessary actions on the part of teachers.25
Finally, the Court held that students have legitimate expectations
of privacy. It rejected the state's argument that these privacy rights
are "fundamental ly] incompatible .. .with the maintenance of a
sound educational environment. " 26 The Court repudiated the no-
tion that children's interests in bringing items of personal property
into school are minimal.
27
Each of these assertions represent noteworthy advancements in
the effort to obtain constitutional protection for students' right to
privacy. The Court effectively overruled lower court holdings that
the fourth amendment is inapplicable in the school context. 28 Com-
mon justifications previously employed to excuse school officials
from obeying fourth amendment requirements are no longer valid.
The Court recognized that students, no less than all citizens, are
entitled to be secure in their persons and belongings and cannot be
subjected to searches without cause.
IV. Reasonableness as the Governing Standard
In the second part of its opinion, the Court determined the stan-
dard which should be used to test the validity of school searches. It
adopted a "reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard,
which it defined in terms of a two-step analysis.2 9 Some commenta-
tors have questioned the reasonableness standard, arguing that the
25. See Dutton, supra note 15, at 144-45.
26. 105 S. Ct. at 742.
27. Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring
personal property into the schools seem anchored in reality. Students at a mini-
mum must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also
keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition,
students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet
highly personal items as photographs, letters and diaries. Finally, students have
perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in con-
nection with extracurricular or recreational activities.
Id.
28. See supra note 3.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40. The Court indicated in T.L.O. that indi-
vidual states may "insist on a more demanding standard under [their] own constitu-
tion[s] or statutes." 105 S.Ct. at 745 n.10. Prior to T.L.O., some state courts had held
that the fourth amendment of the federal constitution required a showing of probable
cause in order for a student search to be legal. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214,
1221 (N.D. Ill. 1976); State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317, 323 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S.
809, on remand, 330 So.2d 900 (La. 1976). In the future, courts may interpret their state
constitutions as requiring a showing of probable cause to validate a student search.
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probable cause test should remain in effect in schools.30 The stan-
dard developed by the Court in fact parallels probable cause and
retains important distinctions that have been developed in fourth
amendment doctrine. Factors unique to the school environment
justify the Court's decision to employ a standard that diverges
slightly from that used in the criminal law. When properly applied,
the reasonableness standard can adequately protect the privacy in-
terests articulated in the first part of the T.L.O. opinion.
A brief review of fourth amendment law is instructive here. Under
traditional fourth amendment analysis, full-scale searches cannot be
conducted in the absence of probable cause; that is, the facts
prompting the search must lead a reasonably cautious person to be-
lieve that a crime has been committed and that evidence will be
found in the place searched. 3' Ordinarily a police officer must make
a showing of probable cause before a magistrate in order to obtain a
search warrant.3 2 Even if exigent circumstances excuse the officer
from obtaining a warrant, she cannot conduct a full-scale search
without having probable cause to do so. 3 3 In either instance, the
absence of probable cause renders the search illegal. Fourth
amendment law is flexible, however, and does allow for a lowering
of the probable cause standard in cases involving minimally intru-
sive searches which serve crucial law enforcement functions. 34 In
30. See Reamey, supra note 12, at 947-49; Reperowitz, School Officials May Conduct Stu-
dent Search Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environ-
ment-In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 738, 744,
752-58 (1984) (criticizes NewJersey Supreme Court's use of reasonableness standard).
justice Brennan claimed in dissent that the abandonment of probable cause would result
in a "dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment," 105 S. Ct. at
752, and would "spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and
administrators." Id. at 756. Brennan did, however, note that the standard adopted by
the Court "may turn out to be probable cause under a new guise." Id. at 757 n.7.
31. See supra note 19.
32. There are five well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement: first,
when consent is given (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)); second, when
the object of the search is in "plain view" (Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236
(1968)); third, when a search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest (United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)); fourth, when exigent circumstances exist (Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970)); and fifth, when in hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden
387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
33. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963); See also W. LAFAVE &J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 109-10 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police officer may stop and frisk indi-
vidual exhibiting suspicious behavior if the officer believes suspect is armed and danger-
ous); United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct 675 (1985) (reliance on a "wanted flyer," which
supports a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offense, justifies a stop
to check identification, pose questions or detain the person briefly while attempting to
obtain further information); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (after stop-
ping person for driving automobile with an expired license plate, police justified in or-
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such situations, the reasonableness of the search is determined by
balancing the privacy interests involved against the cost to the gov-
ernment of applying probable cause as opposed to some lesser
standard.
3 5
In T L. 0., the Court held that the validity of a student search rests
"on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search." 3 6 The Court defined this standard in terms of a two-fold
inquiry: the search must be justified at its inception and permissible
in its scope. The former requirement is met "when there are rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school." 37 This language closely parallels that tradition-
ally used to define probable cause. However, because the standard
was designed for the school setting, it encompasses regulations that
may fall outside the criminal law, thereby acknowledging the need
of school officials to enforce rules inapplicable in other contexts.
The methods used in a student search are permissible when they
"are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not ex-
cessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction." 38 This statement incorporates the flexibil-
dering driver to get out of car, and, upon observing bulge in driver's jacket, officer could
perform a "pat down" to see if person was armed); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976) (routine stopping of a vehicle at a fixed checkpoint near the Mexi-
can border for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants need not be based on reason-
able or individualized suspicion); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.
1973) (person boarding airplane subject to search based on mere or unsupported
suspicion).
35. The use of this test is perhaps best demonstrated in Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-29. In
that case the Court found that it would be too costly to require probable cause prior to a
frisk of a suspect's outer clothing "[wihen an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others." Id. at 24.
36. 105 S. Ct. at 743-44.
37. Id. at 744. The New Jersey Supreme Court and other state courts which have
applied a reasonableness standard have required a reasonable suspicion that the search
would produce evidence of a violation of law or a violation of a school rule related to the
maintenance of order and discipline. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827,
832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781, 784
(1977). The United States Supreme Court required a reasonable suspicion that the
search would produce evidence of a violation of law or a school rule of any kind; that is,
the Court did not specify which type of school rules, if violated, could trigger a search.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens interpreted this as an attempt to broaden the basis for
permissible searches within schools. 105 S. Ct. at 766. The definition of the reasonable-
ness standard articulated by the Court, however, guards against such a result. The
Court specifically stated that the nature of the infraction must be taken into considera-
tion in determining the validity of student searches. This directive should restrict the
number of searches prompted by negligible violations. See infra text accompanying notes
38-40.
38. 105 S. Ct. at 744.
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ity provided for in traditional fourth amendment analysis. By factor-
ing in the "intrusiveness of the search," the Court recognized that
full-scale searches must be distinguished from minimal intrusions
upon privacy. In taking into account the student's sex and age, the
Court perceived that the search of a student by a teacher of the op-
posite sex may constitute an excessive intrusion upon the student's
privacy and that expectations of privacy may vary with age.39 By
considering "the objectives of the search" and "the nature of the
infraction," the Court provided the means for maintaining the cru-
cial distinction between searches conducted for the ordinary pur-
pose of maintaining order in the school environment and those
serving more serious law enforcement functions.
40
The reasonableness standard was designed to cover searches con-
ducted solely by school officials. The Court specifically stated that it
was not addressing the standard which should govern searches con-
ducted in conjunction with or at the behest of the police. 4 1 After
examining the school setting, the Court determined that educators
require a degree of flexibility in enforcing rules that is not afforded
law enforcement officials. The Court was persuaded by a "unique-
ness of the school environment" theory developed by lower
courts. 42 This theory is premised on the need to maintain an atmos-
39. Several courts have determined that the student's age should be taken into con-
sideration in determining the reasonableness of a student search. See, e.g., McKinnon,
558 P.2d at 784; People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 470, 358 N.Y.S.2d
403 (1977); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53; State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463
A.2d 934, 942 (1983).
40. Under traditional fourth amendment doctrine, an officer engaged in the routine
enforcement of the criminal law must have probable cause before conducting a search.
However, in situations involving more critical law enforcement concerns (for instance,
when an officer's life is in danger), a limited search may be permitted under a lower level
of suspicion. See supra note 34.
41. 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.7.
42. See, e.g., Horton v. Gosse Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983) (noting that the unique nature of the school
environment is created by the school's duty to protect students and by the mandatory
gathering together of individuals "too young to be considered capable of mature re-
straint in their use of illegal substances or dangerous instrumentalities," id. at 480, the
court held that student searches may be permitted on the basis of a "reasonable cause
standard." Id. at 481). See also M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Catham Community Unit
School District No. 5, 419 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (students' fourth amendment
rights balanced against school administrators' need to maintain an educational environ-
ment); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (special responsibility of
school officials to provide safe atmosphere taken into account in assessing reasonable-
ness of search); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)
(maintenance of university's "educational atmosphere"justified finding room inspection
facially valid). The New Jersey Supreme Court in T.L.O. also adopted a reasonableness
standard based on the special nature of the school environment. Earlier cases are sum-
marized in Buss, supra note 3, at 769-70.
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phere conducive to learning.
In support of this theory the Court noted that "[m]aintaining or-
der in the classroom has never been easy . . ..." and suggested that
the task has become more difficult in recent years due to the
proliferation of crime in schools. 43 It observed that preserving dis-
cipline in schools requires the enforcement of rules that prohibit
conduct which is otherwise permissible for adults. Within schools
"[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and some-
times require immediate, effective action."'44 According to the
Court, some measure of informality is required in order for schools
to be secure environments where learning can take place.
These assertions seem undeniable. When a large number of chil-
dren are gathered together in a closed setting, discipline and safety
issues will inevitably arise. Conduct must be regulated. The types
of rules needed and their importance may vary depending on such
factors as the age of the students and the size of the classroom.
Teachers need to discipline behavior that would disrupt the class-
room environment and impede the progress of learning.
The increase of crime in schools has intensified the problem of
maintaining safety and order. Drug use, violence, and the use of
dangerous weapons in schools have raised concern nationwide.
45
While the prevalence of these problems varies considerably from
one school to the next, their widespread existence seriously affects
the ability of educators to ensure students' safety.
Nonetheless, the Court chose not to bring the warrant require-
ment and the probable cause test into the schoolhouse. Teachers
are faced with a wide spectrum of disciplinary concerns, yet their
primary duty is to educate. They should not be expected or en-
couraged to function exactly like police officers. Standards devel-
oped for criminal suspects could be overly burdensome and
ineffective in schools. Traditional fourth amendment doctrines
43. 105 S. Ct. at 742. The Court relied heavily on a 1978 Department of Health,
Education and Welfare study, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS - SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS (1978), which showed that drug use and violent crime have become a major
problem in some schools.
44. 105 S. Ct. at 743 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
45. See NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMIN., SCHOOL CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND SOME ATrEMPTED SOLUTIONS
(1980); N.J. DEP'T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT ON STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT OF INCIDENTS OF
VIOLENCE, VANDALISM, AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE SCHOOLS (1981); GOVERNOR'S (MICH.)
TASK FORCE, SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM REPORT (1979); CAL. STATE DEP'T OF
EDUC., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1981);
N.J. SCHOOL B'DS Ass'N, SCHOOL VIOLENCE SURVEY (1977).
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were not designed to address the non-criminal behavior that is par-
ticularly troublesome in schools. Moreover, while schoolchildren
have legitimate expectations of privacy, these expectations may dif-
fer from those of adults. Laws governing contact between police
and adult citizens may be excessively restrictive in a first-grade
classroom.
46
The T.L.0. Court sought to make necessary adjustments to fourth
amendment doctrines without compromising the privacy rights of
students. It adopted a standard which calls for a case-by-case analy-
sis that takes into account those factors which are significant in a
school context. 47 It is a workable tool for educators, and, if applied
properly, the results it yields should not diverge significantly from
those obtained under traditional fourth amendment analysis. Simi-
lar standards have in fact been used by lower courts to invalidate
school searches and thereby protect students' right to privacy. 48
The first two parts of the T.L.O. opinion complement one an-
other. The Court announced that students have rights to privacy
and fashioned a standard to protect those rights. The third part of
the opinion, in which the Court attempted to apply its standard to
the facts of the case, effectively ignored these achievements. A re-
view of the facts demonstrates that the search in question consti-
tuted an unreasonable violation of a student's privacy rights. The
Court did not recognize this because it failed to apply properly the
very standard it had designed to protect those rights.
49
46. Cf People v.Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 468-69, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977) (discussing the
need for adjustments to traditional fourth amendment doctrines within schools).
47. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated, "I would not think it necessary to develop
a single standard to govern all school searches, any more than traditional Fourth
Amendment law applies even the probable-cause standard to all searches and seizures."
105 S. Ct at 757. The standard articulated by the Court, however, is no less adaptable
than traditional fourth amendment law. The Court instructed school officials to con-
sider the particular circumstances that might prompt a search, and to "regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense." Id. at 744. In defining
the reasonableness standard, the Court retained the flexibility that concerns Justice
Brennan. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
48. See, e.g., Scott D., 315 N.E.2d 466 (drugs obtained in search prompted by insuffi-
cient cause excluded under reasonableness standard); Bellnier, 438 F. Supp. 47 (under
reasonableness standard, strip search of entire fifth grade class in attempt to locate miss-
ing three dollars held to violate students' constitutional rights); Horton V. Gosse Creek
Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536
(1983) (canine inspection of students' persons to deter abuse of drugs and alcohol when
there is no individualized suspicion is unconstitutional under reasonable cause stan-
dard); State ex rel. T.L.O., 93 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983) (search in question held
invalid under reasonableness standard).
49. In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also argued that the
Court improperly assessed the facts of the case at bar. 105 S. Ct. at 758.
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V. Application of the Reasonableness Standard
In assessing the facts of the T L. 0. case, the Court limited its con-
sideration to whether the assistant principal had reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search would produce evidence that T.L.O.
had violated the school rule prohibiting smoking in the bathroom.
The Court mistakenly concluded that he did.
In fact, smoking was allowed in designated areas of the school; the
presence or absence of cigarettes in T.L.O's purse was not conclu-
sive evidence that she had been smoking in the bathroom. This be-
comes clear if we momentarily alter the conversation that preceded
the search. Suppose that instead of claiming that she did not smoke
at all, T.L.O. had said, "I do smoke, but only in designated areas,
and never in the bathroom." The presence of cigarettes in her
purse would not be evidence of wrongdoing, and the assistant prin-
cipal would have had no cause for conducting the search.
The Court went astray in focusing on the student's credibility,
which was admittedly undermined by the presence of cigarettes in
her purse.50 School officials do not have the discretion to conduct a
search in order to find out whether a student is fibbing. Under the
standard adopted by the Court, a search must be expected to un-
cover evidence that a student has violated the law or a school rule.
Whether a student has failed to tell the truth is irrelevant to the
decision to conduct a search and should not be taken into account in
assessing the validity of a search. Thus if the Court considered the
search of T.L.O. to be justified by her alleged lie, it stepped outside
the standard it had set forth. Lying is not an offense that overrides
fourth amendment rights and triggers an invasion of privacy.
Moreover, the Court ignored the second step of the required
analysis. The Court did not realistically consider whether the meas-
ures adopted by the assistant principal were "reasonably related to
the object of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
50. 105 S. Ct. at 745-46. In its attempt to explain why the search for cigarettes was
reasonable, the Court never discussed the relevance of cigarettes as evidence of the al-
leged violation alone. Instead, it combined any such discussion with reference to the
issue of T.L.O.'s credibility:
[I]t cannot be said that T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the
charges against her or to her response to those charges. . . . [Plossession of ciga-
rettes . . . would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and un-
dermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. . . . The
relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question of whether she had
been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the nec-
essary nexus. . ..
Id.
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age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." The
infraction here involved at most disregard for a relatively minor
school regulation. 5' (The discovery of marijuana should be put
aside for a moment, for the search was not prompted by the suspi-
cion that the purse contained drugs.) In fact, it is conceivable that
the search was not motivated by any infraction, but rather stemmed
from the assistant principal's annoyance at what he believed to be a
lie. If this is true, then the assistant principal abused his authority
and unjustifiably invaded T.L.O.'s privacy. In addition, the Court
focused no attention on the nature of the search or the age and sex
of the student. A male school official emptied and examined the
entire contents of a teenaged girl's pocketbook. He may have uncov-
ered personal items which might have embarrassed the student,
such as contraceptives or letters. 52 This was not a minimally intru-
sive search serving a function crucial to law enforcement or school
safety, but was rather an invasion of privacy undertaken for the rou-
tine purpose of maintaining discipline. 53
The Court's error arose in part because it divided the search in
question into two searches: first, the search for cigarettes, and sec-
ond, the search for marijuana. 54 As noted, with respect to the first
search, the Court never applied the second prong of the required
two-step analysis. Had it proceeded properly, the Court would have
concluded that the search for cigarettes was impermissible in scope.
Because this search was unreasonable, there was no need to ex-
amine the legality of the subsequent search for marijuana: it should
never have taken place. The Court only proceeded to the second
51. T.L.O.'s companion, who admitted to violating the rule against smoking in the
bathroom, received a minor sanction; she was assigned to a short-term smoking clinic.
State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 336-37, 463 A.2d 934 (1983). Had the infraction been
considered more serious, the response would probably have been suspension or expul-
sion from school. T.L.O.'s ten-day suspension obviously stemmed from the result of the
search - the discovery of drugs - and not from the initial violation.
52. In the first part of its opinion, the Court recognized students' legitimate need to
carry items of personal property. 105 S. Ct. at 742. See supra text accompanying notes
25-27.
53. Earlier in the opinion, the Court acknowledged the serious nature of this search:
We have also recognized that searches of closed items of personal lugggage are
intrusions on protected privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment provides
protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain
view." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 ... A search of a child's person
or of a closed purse carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out
on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.
105 S. Ct. at 741-42. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979) ("luggage is
a common repository for one's personal effects and therefore is inevitably associated
with the expectation of privacy").
54. 105 S. Ct. at 745.
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prong of the reasonableness inquiry when it discussed the search for
marijuana - and even there it did so in a cursory and unsatisfactory
manner. The unfortunate result of the Court's methodology is that
the nature of the violation prompting the initial search was forgot-
ten. The fact that T.L.O. was being disciplined for allegedly smok-
ing a cigarette in the bathroom became no longer relevant. The
entire incident was mistakenly seen as a crackdown on drug use in
schools. While the evidence uncovered in this search is troubling, it
cannot be used ex post to justify the improper intrusion on this stu-
dent's privacy.
55
The Court's misapplication of the reasonableness standard in
T.L.O. results in a significant divergence from traditional fourth
amendment analysis. Important distinctions based upon the gravity
of the offense and the extent of the search evaporate. Smoking a
cigarette in the bathroom becomes equated with the use of a dan-
gerous weapon. Examining the contents of a purse becomes analo-
gous to briefly detaining a student in the hall.56 Under this broad
application of the standard, students could be subjected to excessive
intrusions on privacy for disregarding the most trivial school guide-
lines. 57 A mechanism for shielding students' legitimate privacy in-
55. See People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1974). The New York Court of Appeals, after invalidating a search which uncovered 13
glassine envelopes containing a white powder and a vial containing nine pills,
admonished:
[T]he conduct of the school teachers was, of course, commendable in their assidu-
ousness to uproot a grave problem in their school. They were proven "right" by
what they found on the defendant following the search. More is required, however,
if arbitrary power is to be avoided, and that is to require a basis for the search at
least to the minimal degree suggested [by the reasonableness standard].
56. Justice Stevens warned in his dissent, "[for the Court, a search for curlers and
sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code is apparently just as important as a
search for evidence of heroine addiction or violent gang activity." 105 S. Ct. at 763. The
Court's decision to adopt the reasonableness standard need not give rise to this con-
cern. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The Court's misuse of the standard,
however, leads to the result feared by Justice Stevens in this case.
57. It is conceivable that student searches may occur even in the absence of an in-
fraction. In the wake of the T.L. 0. decision, the board of education of the Carlstadt-East
Rutherford Regional High School District in Bergen County, New Jersey, voted to re-
quire all of the high school's 500 students to undergo blood and urine tests, which
would be used, inter alia, to detect drug and alcohol abuse. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985,
at E8, col. 1. It is possible that the failure of the Supreme Court to protect the privacy
rights of T.L.O. misled New Jersey school officials into believing that they have unbri-
dled discretion to conduct student searches. According to Jeffrey Fogel, Executive Di-
rector of the New Jersey chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, the T.L.O.
decision renders the Carlstadt-East Rutherford drug detection program illegal, since
T. L. 0. applied the fourth amendment to student searches, and "one of the sine qua nons
of the fourth amendment is individualized rather than group suspicion." Id. Mr. Fogel
also asserted that the program violates students' civil liberties and "turns the notion of
innocent until proven guilty on its head." id.
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terests was developed but then discarded in the T.L.O. case.
The misuse of the reasonableness standard also allowed the Court
to skirt the exclusionary rule question raised in state court, thereby
leaving students doubly vulnerable. The exclusionary rule only pro-
hibits the admission of evidence obtained illegally. Because the
Court found that the search of T.L.O. was legal, it did not even con-
sider the question of whether the evidence obtained should have
been excluded from court hearings. Under the Court's use of the
reasonableness standard, students on school grounds receive signif-
icantly less protection against invasions of privacy than do criminal
suspects. Yet the evidence obtained in school searches can be ad-
mitted in criminal court and used against students in criminal pro-
ceedings. Previously the Court drew a distinction between the
school setting and the criminal justice system. It found that stu-
dents have privacy rights, but that the school environment required
a modification of traditional fourth amendment standards. The de-
cision to treat the school setting as unique should not be disre-
garded. If students are to be offered significantly less fourth
amendment protection while in school, the evidence obtained in the
school context should be used only within that institution's own
non-criminal sanctioning process. When school officials involve po-
lice in a search or intend to instigate a criminal prosecution, their
conduct should be regulated by established fourth amendment law
and the evidence they obtain should be judged accordingly.
VI. Conclusion
The Court's misapplication of the reasonableness standard did
not invalidate its affirmation of students' privacy rights. The Court
adopted a standard which can adequately protect these rights while
allowing teachers the flexibility needed to guard students' safety and
maintain order in schools. Unless they are acting in concert with the
police, school officials are not required to obtain warrants or to
comply with the probable cause standard used in criminal law.
58
Teachers are expected to recognize the legitimate privacy interests
of their students and to refrain from conducting unreasonable
searches.
The force of the TL.O. opinion lies in the two-pronged test gov-
erning the reasonableness of student searches. This test prohibits
searches prompted by insufficient evidence and defines the methods
58. But see supra note 29.
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permissible in conducting searches. It explicitly requires educators
to consider the particular circumstances surrounding an alleged rule
violation. If school officials adhere to the test articulated by the
Supreme Court, they will be restrained from unjustifiably invading
students' privacy.
While the Court advanced the rights of students nationwide, it
upheld an infringement on the rights of the student petitioning for
relief. The Court inadequately considered the evidence which
prompted the search of T.L.O.. It ignored her age and sex and the
nature of the alleged infraction at issue in her case. The Court
failed to utilize the test it had designed to preserve students' pri-
vacy. In the final analysis, T.L.O.'s holding that students' are enti-
tled to fourth amendment protection was of little comfort to the
student whose claim of an unreasonable search brought the issue
before the Supreme Court.
-Jane M. Lavoie
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